International: Food Security. Tanzania farm land. Foreign Investments.

"In 2012 activists welcomed a government announcement that it would cap the size of investment deals at 10,000 hectares, but although this was supposed to come into effect in January, it has yet to do so. "  Why?

Binta
=======================

Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2013 23:01:14 +0000

CONTENTS:

1 - Analysis: The poisoned chalice of Tanzania's land deals

IRINGA, 7 November (IRIN) - For more than a decade Tanzania has been wooing foreign investors to help modernize and reinvigorate its agricultural sector - which engages about 80 percent of the population - as a way of boosting national development.

But many supposed beneficiaries, such as smallholder Ahmed Kipanga, a 37-year-old father of five from the coastal Kisarawe District, feel short-changed.

"I used to till my land and grow enough food to feed my family," he told IRIN in Mbeya, 600km south of a home he no longer has access to, adding that he was also able to earn around US$250 selling his surplus crop for each of the year's two seasons.

"I just gave my land because we were convinced by a politician that it would make us rich. I knew I would get money for the land, and also get a well-paying job when the [investment] company began operations. Now they didn't do anything and they sold our land to another company we didn't even know," he added. 

 "We have been chasing our money for the land but they [district officials] keep telling different things every time we go for the money. I am not sure we will be paid [compensation]," he said.

 Kipanga now has no farm to grow food on and struggles to make ends meet by crushing rocks manually. A 7-tonne truckload brings in around $90, a sum he splits with two friends. Demand for the rocks is irregular.

In 2009, Kipanga was among 1,500 residents of 11 villages whose combined 8,211 hectares were leased to a British company that planned to grow jatropha [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/92267/climate-change-jatropha-not-really-green ] as a biofuel. The villages were given verbal promises of jobs, paved roads, new schools and a hospital.

But, as jatropha turned out to be less of a miracle [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/92267/climate-change-jatropha-not-really-green ] crop than envisaged, the project collapsed after a couple of years and was bought out by another firm which has left it dormant, employing only a handful of security guards to keep other villagers off the land.

According to the Oakland Institute, a US think tank which documented this particular [ http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/press-release-cautionary-tale-tanzanian-villagers-pay-biofuel-investment-disaster ] case as well land deals at the national [ http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_country_report_tanzania.pdf ] and continental level, not only are the villagers worse off now, landless, jobless and with no compensation, but they also suffered a drop in income and living standards even when the project was functioning.

Some 27 agricultural investment deals have been signed in Tanzania since 2008, covering 274,228 hectare, according to data compiled by the Land Matrix [ http://landmatrix.org/get-the-detail/by-target-country/united-republic-of-tanzania/?order_by=&more=70 ]. Of these, 11 projects have either been abandoned (including a 34,000 hectare jatropha plantation in Kilwa District), or have yet to start production more than a year after contracts were signed. Just eight are operational.

In all, the Oakland Institute says, some 4.5 million hectares in Tanzania is being sought by foreign investors planning biofuel or food production and encouraged by the 2009 adoption of the Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) initiative.

This includes the so-called AgriSol deal [ http://reliefweb.int/report/united-republic-tanzania/understanding-land-investment-deals-africa-lives-hold-impact-agrisol ], which, if it eventually goes through in the face of fierce local opposition, could see some 160,000 people displaced from their land in Mpanda District, Katabi Region, in the far west of the country.

Best laid plans

Since 2005, the share of Tanzania's budget spent on agriculture has risen more than fourfold [ http://www.africaforum.info/2012/Presentations%20from%20working%20groups%20-%20sub-themes/Policy%20%20CAADP/Policy%20Day%204%20Agricultural%20Council%20of%20Tanzania.pptx ], from 2.2 to 9 percent.

But, for the authors of a 2012 paper [ http://www.theigc.org/sites/default/files/Leyaro%20and%20Morrissey%202013.pdf ] by the International Growth Centre the effects have yet to trickle down: "[P]erformance in agricultural output and productivity has been disappointing. Policies and plans, such as `agriculture is the mainstay of the economy' and Kilimo Kwanza have remained [mere] slogans to the public as there is so little experience of reforms that have improved livelihoods, and millions in the agriculture sector remain in poverty."

Inadequate land-management legislation, the opaqueness of the deals and the widespread lack of title deeds have conspired to make large-scale land investment deals particularly problematic.

"There is mounting evidence that most deals have failed to deliver on their promises," Lorenzo Cotula, land rights and natural resources specialist at the Institute for Environment and International Development (IIED) [ http://www.iied.org/ ], told IRIN.

"Villagers have lost land, many investments have been discontinued, and jobs have been few and short-lived. Success stories are difficult to come by," he added.

"The law regulating the deals makes villagers vulnerable to dispossession. National laws only recognize weak land rights to rural people, and legal safeguards are ineffective," he said.

Other problems cited by Cotula include inadequate local consultation, non-compliance with legal requirements and conflict.

For Oakland Institute Executive Director Anuradha Mittal, across the world, "these largely unregulated land acquisitions are resulting in virtually none of the promised benefits for local populations, but instead are forcing millions of small farmers off ancestral lands and small, local food farms in order to make room for export commodities."

A senior official in the Prime Minister's Office, who asked not to be named because he was not authorized to speak to the media, defended the government's move to lease out land to foreign investors.

"Those cases that have failed are like any business that faces risks. These foreign investors have the money to set up large farms which would ensure people have employment and we can feed ourselves as a nation," he told IRIN. 

 "But I believe there are certain things we can do better like ensuring that people receive compensations for the land they live on. We must ensure people have some form of proof of ownership which we haven't done adequately," he added.

"This programme began in 2009 and I believe because acquisitions for related investments can drag on for years at times, I believe it is too early to judge its success."

The way ahead 

 For land deals to benefit farmers, says Cotula, "villagers must have greater control over their resources, through stronger rights but also through collective action that can give real leverage to legal rights."

Yefred Myenzi, the director of Haki Ardhi, a local land rights advocacy organization, said joint ventures between the local communities owning the land and investors could help ensure local communities do not lose out.

"Out-grower schemes [where the farmers continue to own their land but produce on behalf of the investor] have also been proposed in which case, the investor provides technical support and market whereas the farmers retain their land and produce with assurance of selling their produce," Myenzi, told IRIN.

In 2012 activists welcomed a government announcement that it would cap the size of investment deals at 10,000 hectares, but although this was supposed to come into effect in January, it has yet to do so.

--

Binta

301-802-2233

http://allafr.org/

Founder, Executive Director of PLAD

International: Food Security. Africa: Monopolizing Maize

Africa: Monopolizing Maize

AfricaFocus Bulletin

November 9, 2013 (131109)

(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor's Note

According to a new report from the African Centre for Biosafety, in

South Africa, "Monsanto's Bt maize, MON810, has failed hopelessly

in South Africa as a result of massive insect resistance, after

only 15 years of its introduction into commercial agriculture." Yet

the same variety is being promoted in other African countries by

projects supported by Monsanto. And South Africa's supply of maize,

a staple food, is dominated by a few large companies and consists

almost entirely of GM crop varieties.

For a version of this Bulletin in html format, more suitable for

printing, go to http://www.africafocus.org/docs13/food1311.php,

and click on "format for print or mobile."

While scientific and public opinion world-wide is fiercely divided

about the safety of genetically-modified crops, South Africa, like

the United States, is a country where the dominance of large-scale

commercial agriculture linked to global seed supply companies has

meant an open door for this controversial technology. Even if one

refrains from judgment on the safety for consumers of the

technology, the threat from the oligopoly of large corporate

interests to control of smallholder farmers' control of their seeds

is undeniable.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains a press release and excerpts

from a new report from the African Centre for Biosafety, one of the

leading civil society research and advocacy organizations on this

issue. The new threat, they stress, is that the South African model

and the sway of South African and global agribusiness will be

further extended in the rest of the continent, including through

the dominance of corporate interests and thinking in philanthropic

projects.

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on food and agriculture issues,

visit http://www.africafocus.org/agexp.php

See, in particular, "Underdeveloping African Agriculture"

http://www.africafocus.org/docs13/ag1306.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++

GM Maize Cartels Gorge Profits on SA's Poor, Eye African Markets

05 November 2013

African Centre for Biosafey

http://www.acbio.org.za/

Contact: Gareth Jones 081 493 4323;

Mariam Mayet 083 269 4309

The African Centre for Biosafety (ACB) has today released its new

research report titled 'GM Maize: Lessons For Africa-Cartels,

Collusion And Control Of South Africa's Staple Food' showing how a

select group of companies, including Tiger Brands, Pioneer and

Premier Foods who have previously fixed the price of bread and

maize meal, commandeer the entire maize value chain and continue to

squeeze the poorest South Africans. The ACB has recently shown that

the entire maize meal market is saturated with GM maize. [ACB

(2013), "Food Fascism in South Africa: Tiger Brands, Pioneer and

Premier Force Feeding the Nation Risky GM Maize."]

The report shows that the South African government, through the

Public Investment Corporation (PIC) is the largest investor in

Tiger Brands, and that over 50% of the company's shares are held

outside South Africa. Pioneer Foods' largest shareholder is Zeder,

the agribusiness investment arm of PSG Konsult Group, a private

financial services company. Premier Foods is 80% owned by private

equity firm Braite, listed on the Euro MTF market in Luxemburg but

domiciled in Malta, both jurisdictions being notorious tax havens.

'These ownership patterns have increased the distance between food

producers and consumers, and are lucrative avenues for capital

accumulation by actors far removed from these firms' locales.' Said

Mariam Mayet, Director of the ACB.

According to Gareth Jones, researcher at the ACB, 'It appears as if

South Africa's major millers and retailers are making healthy

profits from our staple food and certainly not passing falling

maize prices onto consumers.' The report shows that from April 2007

to April 2013, the average cost of a 5 kg bag of maize meal

increased by 43.7% in rural areas, and 51.8% in urban areas. 'These

sharp price increases aggravate the already appalling conditions

that millions of South Africans live under. This is particularly

significant for the poor, who spend 41% of their income on an

average "food basket" said Jones.

Further findings of the report include:

* Two companies Monsanto and Pioneer Hi-Bred control the maize seed

market;

* Maize handling and storage is dominated by three companies

Senwes, NWK and Afgri, all former co-ops;

* Louis Dreyfus and Cargill, international grain traders, dominate

the maize trade on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange;

* A highly concentrated value chain feeds into an equally

concentrated food retail sector, with four major retailers:

Shoprite/Checkers, Pick n Pay, Spar and Woolworths dominating the

market.

Rest of Continent at risk

According to the report, Premier and Pioneer have all expanded

their operations on the continent. Tiger Brands already operates in

22 countries on the continent and is a key player in establishing

maize value chains in Southern Africa. 'Having already gorged their

profit margins on the poorest of the poor in South Africa, these

corporate giants are now glancing covetously to the vast African

market north of the Limpopo. Experiences from South Africa should

serve as stark warnings' said Mayet.

Urgent Change Needed

The ACB report calls for an urgent reversal of this economic

concentration and for mechanisms to be put in place to develop

small players throughout the maize value chain, from farmers to

millers and retailers. This should include the promotion of agro-

ecological production methods, decentralised value chains and

public maize breeding programmes that provide access to seed that

can be freely shared and exchanged.

**********************************************************

Africa bullied to grow defective Bt Maize: The failure of

Monsanto's MON810 maize in South Africa

http://www.acbio.org.za

[The African Centre for Biosafety (ACB) is a non-profit

organisation, based in Johannesburg, South Africa. It was

established to protect Africa's biodiversity, traditional

knowledge, food production systems, culture and diversity, from the

threats posed by genetic engineering in food and agriculture. It

has in addition to its work in the field of genetic engineering,

also opposed biopiracy, agrofuels and the Green Revolution push in

Africa, as it strongly supports social justice, equity and

ecological sustainability.]

Key Findings

1. Monsanto's Bt maize, MON810, has failed hopelessly in South

Africa as a result of massive insect resistance, after only 15

years of its introduction into commercial agriculture. In an effort

to deal with the pest infestation, Monsanto has compensated South

African farmers who experienced more than 10% damage on their

genetically modified (GM) insect resistant crops – some farmers

experienced as high as 50% insect infestation. MON810 is now

obsolete in SA and has been replaced with Monsanto's GM stacked

variety, MON8903, which expresses two different cry proteins,

Cry1A.105 and Cry2Ab.

2. Bt technology was approved in SA before regulatory authorities

were capacitated to regulate it properly. MON810 was not fit for

commercial release and should never have been granted commercial

approval. The necessary monitoring of insect resistance was not

carried out and regulators did not ensure that farmers were

carrying out the required insect resistance management(IRM)

strategies, i.e. planting refuges.

3. In any event, IRM strategies were based on the false assumption

that the inheritance of resistance to MON810 was a recessive, not

dominant trait. In terms of this false assumption, current IRM

strategies require farmers to plant a 5% non-Bt maize 'refuge'

which may not be sprayed, or a 20% refuge which may be sprayed.

However, recent research has shown that the inheritance of

resistance is a dominant trait and that in order to stem rapid and

large-scale resistance, farmers will need to plant more than 50%

non-Bt maize as a refuge where non-resistant individuals can breed.

This requirement is not viable for farmers, highlighting the

unsustainability of the technology.

4. In Kenya, an attempt to commercialise publically developed Bt

technology in open-pollinated seed (which can produce a viable crop

year after year) by a charitable project called Insect Resistant

Maize for Africa (IRMA), funded by the Syngenta Foundation, failed

after 10 years of work. IRMA was unable to find Bt genes in the

public domain that were effective against the African stem borer.

It also came to realise that Bt technology cannot be used in open-

pollinated varieties because reusing seed that has been engineered

with Bt genes would expedite the development of insect resistance,

rendering the technology useless within a couple of seasons. The

IRMA project also found the cost of biotech seeds prohibitive for

typical African farmers. Hence IRMA abandoned their attempt to

bring Bt technology to resource poor farmers.

5. Another charitable project, the Water Efficient Maize for Africa

(WEMA) project which for the best part of five years only focused

on drought tolerant maize varieties in South Africa, Tanzania,

Mozambique, Kenya and Uganda is now incorporating MON810 into their

drought tolerant varieties. Monsanto has donated MON810 to the

project, royalty free. Unlike IRMA, WEMA's values are not

underpinned by a desire to bring GM crops that are appropriate for

African farmers onto the market. Although WEMA's products are said

to be 'royalty free'to small-holder farmers, the seed will be sold

to seed companies under strict licensing conditions. Under the

auspices of the WEMA project, trials of MON810 are already taking

place in Kenya and Uganda. WEMA is thus a convenient vehicle for

Monsanto to gain regulatory approval in Africa for the commercial

cultivation of MON810.

6. In Egypt, MON810 has been genetically engineered into a local

Egyptian maize variety called Ajeeb. This Egyptian variety has now

been patented by Monsanto. The introduction of GM technology on a

large scale in Egypt has largely failed to date, due to corruption

and difficulties in passing its Biosafety law. ...

Introduction

Genetic engineering (GE) is undoubtedly one of the most

controversial technologies to emerge in the 20th century; the

advent of modern biotechnology has 'triggered major scientific,

social and political controversies' since its introduction in the

1970's. The story of one of the first genetically modified (GM)

products to come onto the market, Monsanto's MON810 maize, which

contains Monsanto's patented Bt gene Cry1Ab, embodies much of the

controversy about genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

The Bt trait, which is toxic to certain agricultural pests, is

derived from a soil microorganism called Bacillus thuringienis

(Bt). MON810 is the 'event' name for the Bt maize variety owned by

Monsanto which expresses the Cry1ab Bt toxin, sold commercially in

South Africa as 'Yieldgard' maize. The Bt toxin expressed in the

crop is meant to render the use of pesticides to control insect

pests unnecessary. MON 810 is one of the oldest GM events on the

market and is approved for human consumption in more than a dozen

countries worldwide, including South Africa. It is also the only GM

variety cultivated in some parts of the European Union, mostly in

Spain. It is, however, banned in eight European countries on

environmental grounds. According to the United States, these bans

are not about safety concerns, but rather political in nature and

constitute unfair 'trade barriers' to American produce.

Unfortunately, Africa has become one of the battle grounds of the

GMO trade war between the US and Europe, and the adoption or

rejection of GMOs in Africa will mean a victory for one side or the

other. The story of MON810 in Egypt is a rich illustration of

Africa's awkward position in this trade war.

South Africa was an extremely early adopter of GM technology, not

just in Africa, which is yet to commercialise GM food crops on a

large scale, but even globally. The South African government issued

a permit for the commercial release of MON810 in 1997 – even before

GMO legislation was in place. This decision opened the door for

Monsanto to colonise the production of our staple food through

aggressive acquisitions in the South African seed industry and

patent laws protecting Monsanto's GM technology. The majority of

maize production in South Africa is carried out by large-scale

commercial farmers, who eagerly adopted the technology for ease of

pest management, savings on pesticides and reduced loss of yield

through pest damage.

However, South Africa is the first place in the world where insect

pest resistance has developed on a large scale. It is now

recognised by the scientific community and South African regulators

that this resistance cannot be managed or remediated; MON810 has

decisively failed. The product has been withdrawn in South Africa

from the 2013 planting season and has been replaced by Monsanto's

MON89034 in an attempt to deal with the insect resistance

problem10. A recent peer-reviewed study has revealed that the

African maize stem borer (Busseola Fusca) hasan inherently low

susceptibility to Bt toxin. Long held assumptions that the

inheritance of resistance to Bt is recessive have been shattered.

Although MON810 will no longer be cultivated in South Africa, the

Department of Agriculture's GM permit lists indicate that Monsanto

is exporting MON810 seeds to Kenya and Uganda for field trials.

This, despite the fact that the most damaging pest that needs to be

controlled in sub-Saharan Africa is the very Busseola Fusca that

has proven to be impervious to MON810 in South Africa. One of the

major vehicles pushing MON810 onto African countries is the

public/private partnership (PPP) spearheaded by the Gates

Foundation and Monsanto, called Water Efficient Maize for Africa

(WEMA). The aim of WEMA is to develop drought resistant crops,

through both conventional breeding and genetic engineering.

However, since 2011, with little fanfare, it has become evident

that MON810 will also be engineered into these new drought tolerant

GM varieties. The veneer of the 'charitable' orientation of the

project provides an excellent opportunity for Monsanto to gain

regulatory approval for a stacked GM event that is said to be both

drought tolerant and resistant to stem borers.

Another PPP, funded by the Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable

Agriculture (SFSA) project, called Insect Resistant Maize for

Africa (IRMA), spent many years attempting to develop Bt maize

varieties appropriate for African conditions. While the

projectsucceeded in developing scientific capacity in GM

technology, it ultimately failed to find an effective gene to

control the African maize stem borer. This, along with massive

obstacles created by intellectual property rights on the

technology, led the IRMA project to abandon the GM side of its

project in 2006. IRMA will now share its wealth of technical know-

how with the WEMA project, as well as assisting with implementation

of biosafety legislation and procedures (such as risk assessment

and experimental protocols) in Kenya, to pave the way for the

introduction of the very technology that has failed in South Africa

– MON810. It is anticipated that the first GM drought resistant and

insect resistant varieties will be released in Uganda and Kenya in

2015.

...

GM Maize – hi-tech, high cost crop

The biotech industry aggressively sells their product on the basis

that it is a key contributor in the global fight against hunger.

However, there are only four GM crops available on the market

(soya, maize, cotton and canola) and these crops are not primarily

valued for their contribution to global food security. This

expensive technology is being deployed in lucrative commodity crops

for the sake of profit.

Maize is the world's tenth most valuable agricultural commodity,

and the second most profitable grain, after wheat. It is the most

important crop in the United States, valued at US$76.5 billion in

2011, representing over 53% of global maize exports. In 2012, 90%

of maize production in the United States was genetically modified

(GM). While many of us in South Africa know maize as a staple food

for many millions of Africans in several countries on the

continent, maize as a staple is not common outside of Africa,

except in Mexico and some parts of the Andean region.

...

Maize – South Africa's staple food compromised

South Africa has eagerly followed GM developments in the United

States, however, an important difference between South Africa and

the world's largest producer of maize, is that maize is the staple

food in South Africa. About 60% of South Africa's maize production

is white maize, used primarily for human consumption, and 40% is

yellow maize, used primarily for animal feed. Maize is eaten

several times daily in a relatively unprocessed form, for example,

milled and boiled into porridge. It is commonly used as a first

food for babies, to wean them off the breast. In 2000, the ultra-

poor spent over 50% of their income on food, of which up to 20% was

spent on maize meal alone. In general, the 'typical' maize meal

consumer refers to a low-income individual residing in an urban and

rural area.

South Africa is unique in the world in that it has allowed the

genetic modification of its staple food. As GM varieties now

comprise close to 90% of the country's maize production, and no

segregation of GM and non-GM exists, consumers have no access

whatsoever to non- GM maize. Recent tests carried out by the ACB on

a range of popular maize brands in South Africa revealed that the

country's staple food is completely saturated with GM content ...

Civil society has petitioned the South African parliament to

seriously look into the matter, claiming that this situation is a

contravention of human rights. Having no choice but to eat a highly

controversial staple food, which is severely restricted in many

countries around the world, has been labelled 'food fascism' by

local social movements. They have also called for a review of

government's risk assessment procedures, to include, amongst other

things, long-term safety studies on human health. Currently, South

African regulatory authorities rely solely on safety data generated

by the producers of GMOs and long-term feeding trials to determine

safety are not required. This safety data is neither peer-reviewed

nor available to the South African public in its entirety, being

protected under laws that allow for the exclusion of information

considered to be 'confidential business information' (cbi).

Corporate takeover of South Africa's maize

As noted earlier, in 1997 Monsanto's GM 'insect resistant' (IR)

maize variety MON810 was approved for environmental release,

meaning that GM maize could be grown on a commercial scale. The

first commercial plantings took place in 1998. During the 2004/05

cropping season, when the South African National Seed Organisation

(SANSOR) began publishing such information, GM maize seed accounted

for 20% of maize seed sales. By

...

The adoption rate of GM maize seed in the intervening period has

been astounding: in 2012, 86% of all maize grown in South Africa

was GM. Up until 2003, when Syngenta's Bt11 was commercially

released in South Africa, all Bt maize hybrids involved MON810. By

2008 three new GM maize events had been approved for cultivation in

South Africa, but MON810 remained the most popular event – over 80%

of all GM maize seed imported into South Africa that year was

MON810.

 ...

As demonstrated above, the uptake of MON810 and subsequent GM

varieties in South Africa was extremely rapid, and Monsanto soon

dominated South Africa's maize seed market. In 1999 and 2000

Monsanto acquired two of South Africa's largest seed companies,

Sensako and Carnia, giving them a dominant share in the maize seed

market. By 2009, Monsanto controlled 50% of the maize seed market

...

...

Conclusion

The greatest beneficiary in the end is the developer or the owner

of the technology, like Monsanto, who has: captured charitable

projects as a way to introduce its product onto the market;

undermined good biosafety policy and gained access to public

germplasm and patented these. At the same time, classical breeding

programmes continue to develop new varieties that are performing

very well in African conditions, and this is done quicker, cheaper

and without the dangers of patents or the need for excessive

regulatory requirements.

It is now time for African governments to take cognisance of the

recommendations of many international reports that support

agroecological farming methods and distance themselves from

privately owned industrial agriculture. Agroecology is the key to

our future food security, social and environmental well-being.

Policies need to be shaped, not to hand over our food systems to

transnational agribusiness, but to support smallholder farmers

using the resources they have available to cultivate diverse food

systems for local consumption.

*****************************************************

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication

providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with

a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus

Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please

write to this address to subscribe or unsubscribe to the bulletin,

or to suggest material for inclusion. For more information about

reposted material, please contact directly the original source

mentioned. For a full archive and other resources, see

http://www.africafocus.org

********************************************************

Fellows Program. Deadline: May 2, 2014. Council of State Governments

'We Need a New Generation of Leaders'

By Mary Branham, CSG Managing Editor

 

Sannie Overly made history this year. The 2013 Council of State Governments

Henry Toll Fellow became the first woman elected to a leadership position in the Kentucky House of Representatives. Even though it's not always easy, Overly encourages young men and particularly young women to pursue a role in public service.

Read the full article »  

Emergency Management magazine: Science During Crisis: Group Helps Decision-Makers with Long-Term Strategy

http://www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/Science-During-Crisis.html

Science During Crisis: Group Helps Decision-Makers with Long-Term Strategy

By: Colin Wood on November 06, 2013

This time last year, Hurricane Sandy was finishing up a one-week tour that consisted of killing (at least) 286 people and causing an estimated $68 billion in damage, making it the second most costly hurricane in U.S. history. On Oct. 24, Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell announced $162 million in funding that will be distributed among 45 restoration and research projects aimed at protecting the Atlantic coast from future storms. The projects selected for funding were chosen based partially on the work of a new organization called the Strategic Sciences Group (SSG).

Formally established in January 2012, the SSG is a small, adaptable group of scientists charged with visiting live disaster sites like Hurricane Sandy or the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and providing decision-makers with information that allows them to make better long-term strategic choices, such as deciding which research projects will be most helpful when the next storm comes.

The SSG’s concept is loosely modeled on the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an intelligence agency that was formed shortly after the U.S. entered World War II and dissolved a few weeks after the war ended. The OSS was a sort of Swiss Army Knife of the military world, without any specific jurisdiction, filling in the gaps between existing government agencies and military branches. The OSS supplied, armed and trained resistance movements like Mao Zedong’s Red Army in China, disseminated propaganda, spied in occupied France, and ultimately supplied leaders with information that became useful in strategic post-war planning. In its search for officers, the OSS described its ideal candidate as a “Ph.D. that can win a bar fight.”

The Strategic Sciences Group is authorized to: •    develop and provide the Department of the Interior with science-based assessments and interdisciplinary scenarios of environmental crises affecting departmental resources; •    rapidly assemble teams of scientists to conduct such work during environmental crises; and •    provide the results of this work to the secretary and departmental leadership to support decision-making during crises. Source: U.S. Department of the Interior

Strategic Sciences Group co-leader Gary Machlis said his group does not, of course, possess the heroism that the OSS demonstrated during WWII, but they borrowed much from the service’s structure and culture, looking at how that organization handled science during a crisis. The SSG has just three permanent members and one research fellow, adding volunteers from various government agencies, private companies and universities as needed when a crisis like Hurricane Sandy occurs — typically ending with a team of 10 to 15 members.

“Our job was to take the available scientific information, what we knew about Sandy and its immediate aftermath, and lay out these scenarios of what are the likely long-term consequences of the hurricane and the aftermath to not just the ecology, not just the economy, and not just the people, but all three together as part of a coupled, human-natural system and present those scenarios with our own certainty about different elements,” said Machlis, who is the science adviser to the National Park Service director. Those evaluations allowed leaders to make better long-term choices regarding the disaster, whereas traditionally most decisions and research during disasters is focused on mitigating short-term damages and dealing with immediate threats, he said.

The SSG does not conduct new research, such as collecting samples in the field, but rather looks at the science that’s already being done and provides analysis. Before the SSG was made an official organization, it conducted its first mission after the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded in 2010. Machlis traveled to the disaster site to review the science being done there as a proof of concept for creating the SSG as a permanent organization.

“I believe that we’re important because we deliver science assessments of a holistic kind … in real time when they’re trying to make decisions, and that kind of additional information is extremely valuable when decision-makers are trying to be smart,” Machlis said. 

Machlis has a doctorate in both sociology and ecology, a combination that he said is helpful in emergency response science that he applies while working onsite with the SSG. “Many of the environmental problems we deal with in a disaster have absolutely essential social components. You can’t solve one without the other,” he said. 

After Hurricane Sandy struck, for instance, he said a community garden group met to help a group of senior citizens that was trapped on the eighth floor of a building without water. “Those nongovernmental organizations at the community level began to play an important new role in recovery and emergency response. And that was fascinating to us and they will play a key role in the future.”

Of the funding that will be provided through the Secretary of the Interior, $113 million will be put toward 25 projects to restore coastal marshes, wetlands and shoreline, improve flood resilience and protect against future storms. An additional $15 million will go toward protecting communities within 60 miles of the New Jersey coast.

Executive Order - Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change

Wed, November 06, 2013

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the   laws of the United States of America, and in order to prepare the Nation for the impacts of climate change by undertaking actions to enhance climate preparedness and resilience, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy.
The impacts of climate change -- including an increase in prolonged periods of excessively high temperatures, more heavy downpours, an increase in wildfires, more severe droughts, permafrost thawing, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise -- are already affecting communities, natural resources, ecosystems, economies, and public health across the Nation. These impacts are often most significant for communities that already face economic or health-related challenges, and for species and habitats that are already facing other pressures. Managing these risks requires deliberate preparation, close cooperation, and coordinated planning by the Federal Government, as well as by stakeholders, to facilitate Federal, State, local, tribal, private-sector, and nonprofit-sector efforts to improve climate preparedness and resilience; help safeguard our economy, infrastructure, environment, and natural resources; and provide for the continuity of executive department and agency (agency) operations, services, and programs.

A foundation for coordinated action on climate change preparedness and resilience across the Federal Government was established by Executive Order 13514 of October 5, 2009 (Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance), and the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force led by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). In addition, through the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), established by section 103 of the Global Change Research Act of 1990 (15 U.S.C. 2933), and agency programs and activities, the Federal Government will continue to support scientific research, observational capabilities, and assessments necessary to improve our understanding of and response to climate change and its impacts on the Nation.

The Federal Government must build on recent progress and pursue new strategies to improve the Nation's preparedness and resilience. In doing so, agencies should promote: (1) engaged and strong partnerships and information sharing at all levels of government; (2) risk-informed decisionmaking and the tools to facilitate it; (3) adaptive learning, in which experiences serve as opportunities to inform and adjust future actions; and (4) preparedness planning.

Section 2. Modernizing Federal Programs to Support Climate Resilient Investment.
(a) To support the efforts of regions, States, local communities, and tribes, all agencies, consistent with their missions and in coordination with the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience (Council) established in section 6 of this order, shall:

(i) Identify and seek to remove or reform barriers that discourage investments or other actions to increase the Nation's resilience to climate change while ensuring continued protection of public health and the environment;

(ii) Reform policies and Federal funding programs that may, perhaps unintentionally, increase the vulnerability of natural or built systems, economic sectors, natural resources, or communities to climate change related risks;

(iii) Identify opportunities to support and encourage smarter, more climate-resilient investments by States, local communities, and tribes, including by providing incentives through agency guidance, grants, technical assistance, performance measures, safety considerations, and other programs, including in the context of infrastructure development as reflected in Executive Order 12893 of January 26, 1994 (Principles for Federal Infrastructure Investments), my memorandum of August 31, 2011 (Speeding Infrastructure Development through More Efficient and Effective Permitting and Environmental Review), Executive Order 13604 of March 22, 2012 (Improving Performance of Federal Permitting and Review of Infrastructure Projects), and my memorandum of May 17, 2013 (Modernizing Federal Infrastructure Review and Permitting Regulations, Policies, and Procedures); and

(iv) Report on their progress in achieving the requirements identified above, including accomplished and planned milestones, in the Agency Adaptation Plans developed pursuant to section 5 of this order.

(b) In carrying out this section, agencies should also consider the recommendations of the State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience (Task Force) established in section 7 of this order and the National Infrastructure Advisory Council established by Executive Order 13231 of October 16, 2001 (Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age), and continued through Executive Order 13652 of September 30, 2013 (Continuance of Certain Federal Advisory Committees).

(c) Interagency groups charged with coordinating and modernizing Federal processes related to the development and integration of both man-made and natural infrastructure, evaluating public health and social equity issues, safeguarding natural resources, and other issues impacted by climate change -- including the Steering Committee on Federal Infrastructure Permitting and Review Process Improvement established by Executive Order 13604, the Task Force on Ports established on July 19, 2012, the Interagency Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska established by Executive Order 13580 of July 12, 2011, and the Federal Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice established by Executive Order 12898 of February 11, 1994 -- shall be responsible for ensuring that climate change related risks are accounted for in such processes and shall work with agencies in meeting the requirements set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this section.

Section 3. Managing Lands and Waters for Climate Preparedness and Resilience.
Within 9 months of the date of this order and in coordination with the efforts described in section 2 of this order, the heads of the Departments of Defense, the Interior, and Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, NOAA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Army Corps of Engineers, and other agencies as recommended by the Council established in section 6 of this order shall work with the Chair of CEQ and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to complete an inventory and assessment of proposed and completed changes to their land- and water-related policies, programs, and regulations necessary to make the Nation's watersheds, natural resources, and ecosystems, and the communities and economies that depend on them, more resilient in the face of a changing climate. Further, recognizing the many benefits the Nation's natural infrastructure provides, agencies shall, where possible, focus on program and policy adjustments that promote the dual goals of greater climate resilience and carbon sequestration, or other reductions to the sources of climate change. The assessment shall include a timeline and plan for making changes to policies, programs, and regulations. Agencies shall build on efforts already completed or underway as outlined in agencies' Adaptation Plans, as discussed in section 5 of this order, as well as recent interagency climate adaptation strategies such as the National Action Plan: Priorities for Managing Freshwater Resources in a Changing Climate, released October 28, 2011; the National Fish, Wildlife and Plants Climate Adaptation Strategy, released March 26, 2013; and the National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan, released April 16, 2013.

Section 4. Providing Information, Data, and Tools for Climate Change Preparedness and Resilience.
(a) In support of Federal, regional, State, local, tribal, private-sector and nonprofit-sector efforts to prepare for the impacts of climate change, the Departments of Defense, the Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and any other agencies as recommended by the Council established in section 6 of this order, shall, supported by USGCRP, work together to develop and provide authoritative, easily accessible, usable, and timely data, information, and decision-support tools on climate preparedness and resilience.

(b) As part of the broader open data policy, CEQ and OSTP, in collaboration with OMB and consistent with Executive Order 13642 of May 9, 2013 (Making Open and Machine Readable the New Default for Government Information), shall oversee the establishment of a web-based portal on "Data.gov" and work with agencies on identifying, developing, and integrating data and tools relevant to climate issues and decisionmaking. Agencies shall coordinate their work on these data and tools with relevant interagency councils and committees such as the National Science and Technology Council and those that support the implementation of Presidential Policy Directive-21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience).

Section 5. Federal Agency Planning for Climate Change Related Risk.(a) Consistent with Executive Order 13514, agencies have developed Agency Adaptation Plans and provided them to CEQ and OMB. These plans evaluate the most significant climate change related risks to, and vulnerabilities in, agency operations and missions in both the short and long term, and outline actions that agencies will take to manage these risks and vulnerabilities. Building on these efforts, each agency shall develop or continue to develop, implement, and update comprehensive plans that integrate consideration of climate change into agency operations and overall mission objectives and submit those plans to CEQ and OMB for review. Each Agency Adaptation Plan shall include:

(i) Identification and assessment of climate change related impacts on and risks to the agency's ability to accomplish its missions, operations, and programs;

(ii) A description of programs, policies, and plans the agency has already put in place, as well as additional actions the agency will take, to manage climate risks in the near term and build resilience in the short and long term;

(iii) A description of how any climate change related risk identified pursuant to paragraph (i) of this subsection that is deemed so significant that it impairs an agency's statutory mission or operation will be addressed, including through the agency's existing reporting requirements;

(iv) A description of how the agency will consider the need to improve climate adaptation and resilience, including the costs and benefits of such improvement, with respect to agency suppliers, supply chain, real property investments, and capital equipment purchases such as updating agency policies for leasing, building upgrades, relocation of existing facilities and equipment, and construction of new facilities; and

(v) A description of how the agency will contribute to coordinated interagency efforts to support climate preparedness and resilience at all levels of government, including collaborative work across agencies' regional offices and hubs, and through coordinated development of information, data, and tools, consistent with section 4 of this order.

(b) Agencies will report on progress made on their Adaptation Plans, as well as any updates made to the plans, through the annual Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan process. Agencies shall regularly update their Adaptation Plans, completing the first update within 120 days of the date of this order, with additional regular updates thereafter due not later than 1 year after the publication of each quadrennial National Climate Assessment report required by section 106 of the Global Change Research Act of 1990 (15 U.S.C. 2936).

Section 6. Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience.
(a) Establishment. There is established an interagency Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience (Council).

(b) Membership. The Council shall be co-chaired by the Chair of CEQ, the Director of OSTP, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. In addition, the Council shall include senior officials (Deputy Secretary or equivalent officer) from:

1. (i) The Department of State;
2. (ii) The Department of the Treasury;
3. (iii) The Department of Defense;
4. (iv) The Department of Justice;
5. (v) The Department of the Interior;
6. (vi) The Department of Agriculture;
7. (vii) The Department of Commerce;
8. (viii) The Department of Labor;
9. (ix) The Department of Health and Human Services;
10. (x) The Department of Housing and Urban Development;
11. (xi) The Department of Transportation;
12. (xii) The Department of Energy;
13. (xiii) The Department of Education;
14. (xiv) The Department of Veterans Affairs;
15. (xv) The Department of Homeland Security;
16. (xvi) The United States Agency for International Development;
17. (xvii) The Army Corps of Engineers;
18. (xviii) The Environmental Protection Agency;
19. (xix) The General Services Administration;
20. (xx) The Millennium Challenge Corporation;
21. (xxi) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
22. (xxii) The U.S. Small Business Administration;
23. (xxiii) The Corporation for National and Community Service;
24. (xxiv) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
25. (xxv) The Council of Economic Advisers;
26. (xxvi) The National Economic Council;
27. (xxvii) The Domestic Policy Council;
28. (xxviii) The Office of Management and Budget;
29. (xxix) The White House Office of Public Engagement and Intergovernmental Affairs;
30. (xxx) The United States Trade Representative; and
31. (xxxi) Such agencies or offices as the President or Co-Chairs shall designate.

(c) Administration. CEQ shall provide administrative support and additional resources, as appropriate, for the Council to the extent permitted by law and within existing appropriations. Agencies shall assist and provide information to the Council, consistent with applicable law, as may be necessary to carry out its functions. Each agency shall bear its own expenses for participating in the Council.

(d) Council Structure. The Co-Chairs shall designate a subset of members of the Council to serve on a Steering Committee, which shall help determine priorities and strategic direction for the Council. The Co-Chairs and Steering Committee may establish working groups as needed, and may recharter working groups of the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, as appropriate.

(e) Mission and Function of the Council. The Council shall work across agencies and offices, and in partnership with State, local, and tribal governments (as well as the Task Force established in section 7 of this order), academic and research institutions, and the private and nonprofit sectors to:

(i) Develop, recommend, coordinate interagency efforts on, and track implementation of priority Federal Government actions related to climate preparedness and resilience;

(ii) Support regional, State, local, and tribal action to assess climate change related vulnerabilities and cost-effectively increase climate preparedness and resilience of communities, critical economic sectors, natural and built infrastructure, and natural resources, including through the activities as outlined in sections 2 and 3 of this order;

(iii) Facilitate the integration of climate science in policies and planning of government agencies and the private sector, including by promoting the development of innovative, actionable, and accessible Federal climate change related information, data, and tools at appropriate scales for decisionmakers and deployment of this information through a Government-wide web-based portal, as described in section 4 of this order; and

(iv) Such other functions as may be decided by the Co-Chairs, including implementing, as appropriate, the recommendations of the Task Force established in section 7 of this order.

(f) Termination of the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force. The Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force (Adaptation Task Force), established in 2009, created the framework for coordinated Federal action on climate preparedness and resilience, driving agency-level planning and action. The Adaptation Task Force shall terminate no later than 30 days after the first meeting of the Council, which shall continue and build upon the Adaptation Task Force's work.

Section 7. State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience.
(a) Establishment. To inform Federal efforts to support climate preparedness and resilience, there is established a State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience (Task Force).

(b) Membership. The Task Force shall be co-chaired by the Chair of CEQ and the Director of the White House Office of Intergovernmental Affairs. In addition, its members shall be such elected State, local, and tribal officials as may be invited by the Co-Chairs to participate. Members of the Task Force, acting in their official capacity, may designate employees with authority to act on their behalf.

(c) Mission and Function. Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Task Force shall provide, through its Co-Chairs, recommendations to the President and the Council for how the Federal Government can:

(i) Remove barriers, create incentives, and otherwise modernize Federal programs to encourage investments, practices, and partnerships that facilitate increased resilience to climate impacts, including those associated with extreme weather;

(ii) Provide useful climate preparedness tools and actionable information for States, local communities, and tribes, including through interagency collaboration as described in section 6 of this order; and

(iii) Otherwise support State, local, and tribal preparedness for and resilience to climate change.

(d) Sunset. The Task Force shall terminate no later than 6 months after providing its recommendations.

Section 8. Definitions. As used in this order:
(a) "Preparedness" means actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build, apply, and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, ameliorate the effects of, respond to, and recover from climate change related damages to life, health, property, livelihoods, ecosystems, and national security;

(b) Adaptation" means adjustment in natural or human systems in anticipation of or response to a changing environment in a way that effectively uses beneficial opportunities or reduces negative effects; and

(c) "Resilience" means the ability to anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to changing conditions and withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from disruptions.

Section 9. General Provisions. 

(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) The authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) The functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with U.S. obligations under international agreements and applicable U.S. law, and be subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

BARACK OBAMA